Speaker
Abstract
This talk will describe how CHERI achieves memory safety for existing code with just a recompile and how that non-bypassable memory safety can be used as a building block for higher-level security abstractions.
CPUs with CHERI support are starting to appear in commercial products now. CHERI began as a DARPA-funded research project at the University of Cambridge and SRI International in 2010 to add support for fine-grained compartmentalisation (providing strong security boundaries around software components within a program) to modern CPU instruction sets. This included support for object-granularity memory safety, which allows usable abstractions for compartmentalisation, where programmers share objects, not pages. CHERI has subsequently been the subject of over £200M of total research, including Arm producing a high-performance test chip (Morello).
Most CHERI work has focused on incremental adoption. Morello, for example, can run versions of Linux and FreeBSD that can run unmodified binaries, and allows individual processes to adopt CHERI features either for isolated sandboxes or for a fully memory-safe process environment. The latter, on CheriBSD (the FreeBSD CHERI variant) includes a complete Wayland and KDE userspace stack.
Any memory-safety bug in any of this software track becomes a recoverable error (trapping before any memory corruption). A small team was able to run well over a hundred million lines of C and C++ in a fully memory safe environment. Rewriting in a safe language such as Rust would have cost orders of magnitude more.
CHERIoT aimed to showcase what will be possible once you can assume CHERI everywhere and design the software model to support this. The CHERIoT Platform is a fully open hardware-software stack for embedded systems that assumes CHERI from the ground up, with a mere 350 instructions that are trusted for the core isolation guarantees (contrast with around 50 KLoC in an embedded microkernel such as Zephyr or millions of lines of code in Linux). Every part of the system is built using CHERI-enabled compartmentalisation and .
The talk will discuss how fine-grained compartmentalisation can be not just possible, but easy on a CHERI system.
Topics
QCon London 2026 is a three day conference for senior software engineers, architects and team leads. An international program committee of working engineers selects every session. Patterns and practices, not products and pitches.
Part of the track
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